M03Lec01: Singer on Animal Welfare This lecture will help you understand: • The utilitarian argument for animal welfare • “The principle of equal consideration of interests” • The nature of “speciesism” • The “marginal case argument” • The conflict between Singer’s animal welfare argument and environmental concerns Peter Singer (1946-), W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University “All Animals Are Equal,” in Animal Liberation (1975) • The modern animal welfare and rights movement may properly be said to have started with the 1975 publication of Animal Liberation by Australian philosopher Peter Singer. In a Nutshell • In his article “All Animals Are Equal,” the key philosophical chapter of the book, Singer states his belief that many animals have the capacity for suffering and thus deserve equal moral consideration. • This means that they should have their interests considered when we are deciding what to do and how to act. Goal and Strategy • Goal: to change our views about the moral status of animals • Strategy: to use the principle of equal consideration to argue that various nonhuman animals deserve the same moral consideration as humans “Women’s Rights, Ergo Brute’s Rights?” • In fact, in the past the idea of “The Rights of Animals” really has been used to parody the case for women’s rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft, a forerunner of later feminists, published her Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, her ideas were widely regarded as absurd, and they were satirized in an anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes. The author of this satire (actually Thomas Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge philosopher) tried to refute Wollstonecraft’s reasonings by showing that they could be carried one stage further. If sound when applied to women, why should the arguments not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? They seemed to hold equally well for these “brutes”; yet to hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion had been reached must be unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it must also be unsound when applied to women, since the very same arguments had been used in each case. The Principle of Equal Consideration • “Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give their needs and interests. The principle of equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.” Meaning of “Equality” • It would be unfair to discriminate on the basis of IQ scores, beauty, talents, physical and mental abilities, etc. • Nor is it any better to give an individual more rights by virtue of his or her membership of some group, gender, or race. Although the racist and the sexist denies it, we have never been able to show significant differences “on average” when it comes to intelligence between the genders or races. But even if there were significant differences, Singer makes the point that this would not provide a justification for treating members of different races differently without regard to individual differences. • He is concerned with equal moral treatment, i.e., extending “equal consideration” to different beings regardless of equality in fact (e.g., equal intelligence) or group membership (race, gender, etc.) The Principle of Equal Consideration • “The principle of equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.” Interests and Suffering • What determines whether a being should be given equal consideration? – Answer: Interests • What determines whether a being has interests? – Answer: the capacity to suffer. “If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.” • “The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is, however, not only necessary, but also sufficient for us to say that a being has interests—at an absolute minimum, an interest in not suffering. A mouse, for example, does have an interest in not being kicked along the road because it will suffer if it is.” Sentience • Singer calls this capacity for enjoyment and suffering: sentience. • It is sentience therefore that is the criterion used to distinguish between those animals whose interests ought, morally, to be considered and those animals that have no interests to consider. • Thus, while the differences between humans and animals may call for quite different treatment in satisfying their interests (a child, for example, requires much in the way of care; a pig probably very little), “the limit of sentience,” Singer says, “is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.” • Singer doesn’t get into the question of which animals actually are sentient (Is an insect sentient? A fish?). But he doesn’t need to. We know that a dog, a cat, a horse, is sentient. (Who seriously would deny it?) And we also know that the majority of the animals that we farm, hunt, and eat (cows, deer, sheep, pigs, etc.), are also sentient, and that is all we need to know if we are to extend to them moral consideration by taking into account their interests when deciding what to do morally. Argument for Equal Consideration Depending on Suffering 1. “If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.” 2. “If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.” 3. “This is why the limit of sentience … is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.” Utilitarianism • A utilitarian believes that the essence of morality was to maximize pleasure or happiness and minimize pain and suffering. Now it doesn’t matter whose pleasure or suffering we are talking about here. – “Each to count for one and none for more than one” (Jeremy Bentham) – “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other” (Henry Sidgwick) • “The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation) Speciesism • “a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of another species.” Analogous to Racism • “The racist … [gives] greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species.” Analogous to Sexism • The sexist gives greater weight to the interests of members of his own gender, when there is a clash between those interests and the interests of women. Speciesism • The speciesist gives greater weight to the interests of members of his own species (Homo sapiens), when there is a clash between those interests and the interests of members of other species. When Are We Justified in Making an Animal Suffer? • Are we ever justified in making an animal suffer? • Perhaps surprisingly, Singer answers “yes.” • Singer is not an absolutist. • Sometimes killing is justified. When is that? This is a complicated issue. Animal Experimentation • “Experiments serving no direct and urgent purpose should stop immediately, and in the remaining fields of research, we should whenever possible, seek to replace experiments that involve animals with alternative methods that do not.” Criterion for Experimentation • “If the experimenters would not be prepared to use a human infant then their readiness to use non-human animals reveals an unjustifiable form of discrimination on the basis of species, since adult apes, monkeys, dogs, cats, rats, and other animals are more aware of what is happening to them, more self-directing, and, so far as we can tell, at least as sensitive to pain as a human infant.” Marginal Case Argument 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. We ought to perform tests on subjects which experience less pain. Testing adult humans brings about more psychological and physical pain than testing animals. We ought to test animals rather than humans. But, cognitively damaged humans and infants don’t suffer psychological pain. So, cognitively damaged humans and infants will suffer no more than animals. Thus, we are justified in preferring animals, infants, and cognitively damaged humans to normal adult humans in testing. But, we think it is wrong to test infants and cognitively damaged humans. Therefore, by parity of reasoning we should think it wrong to test animals. Environmental Criticisms • How are we to weigh diverse and competing interests? Would a human’s interest in fencing off prairie for agricultural purposes override a wild animal’s interest in unobstructed habitat? How does the spotted owl’s interest in oldgrowth forests in the Pacific compare with human interest in lumber? Environmental Criticisms • As moral agents, do we have a responsibility to interfere with the life of animals in the wild? Should we protect predators or prey? Are the interests of a starving wolf equal to the interests of a single member of a large herd of caribou? Environmental Criticisms • Singer’s views suggests conclusions counterintuitive to many environmentalists. Given the amount of suffering that can take place with intensive farming techniques, anyone of literally billions of chickens would have a stronger moral claim against us (to relieve its suffering) than would the last remaining members of a plant or invertebrate species. Environmental Criticisms • An animal that is a member of an endangered species has no special moral status. We have no greater duty to mountain gorillas and black rhinos than to a stray cat, and we certainly have no direct ethical obligation to the millions of species of plants and animals that are not sentient or conscious, and therefore have no interests as Singer understands them. Environmental Criticisms • The emphasis on individuals also leads to controversial suggestions for wildlife management. Singer, for example, recognizes that it is conceivable that human interference could improve the conditions of wild animals. • Nevertheless, judging in part on the basis of past failures, he recommends a policy of leaving wild animals alone as much as possible. We do enough, he tells us, “if we eliminate our own unnecessary killing and cruelty toward other animals.” M03Lec02 Regan on Animal Rights This lecture will help you understand: • The reasons for granting moral rights to animals • An argument against Singer’s utilitarian justification for animal welfare • The notion of “inherent value” • The “weak” animal rights position (Warren) Tom Regan (1938-), The Case for Animal Rights (1993) • Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983) • “The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us — to be eaten, or surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport or money.” Goal Regan calls for the total abolition of the use of animals in: – Science – Commercial farming – Commercial and sport hunting and trapping Outline of Argument • Regan argues that the majority of animals involved in such practices are like us, i.e., conscious beings whose welfare is not a matter of indifference to them. • Thus, “they too must be viewed as experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own.” Critique of Three Positions • Indirect Duty View • Cruelty-Kindness View • Utilitarianism Indirect Duty View • Indirect duty view is the view that humans have no direct obligations or duties to animals but only to other humans. • This is the view adopted by Kant: “so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. … Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity.” Spurious Justifications • Animals feel no pain, in which case there’s nothing to be concerned about. – Nonsense, Everyone knows lots of animals feel pain! • The only pain that matters is human pain. – Arbitrary. Why draw the line between human pain and animal pain? Contractarianism • Morality consists in the rules that individuals voluntarily enter into: – Those who enter into the contract have rights directly protected by the contract – Those who do not or cannot enter into the contract have no direct rights under the contract (e.g., infants, animals) – The contract may indirectly protect those who cannot enter because they are valued by those who are in the contract. • “I love my pet, so don’t kick it!” • “I have, then, according to contractarianism, no duty directly to your dog or any other animal, not even the duty not to cause them pain or suffering; my duty not to hurt them is a duty I have to those people who care about what happens to them. As for other animals, where no or little sentimental interest is present–in the case of farm animals, for example, or laboratory rats–what duties we have grow weaker and weaker, perhaps to vanishing point. The pain and death they endure, though real, are not wrong if no one cares about them.” Regan’s Argument against Contractarianism • “And yet it seems reasonably certain that, were we to torture a young child or a retarded elder, we would be doing something that wronged him or her, not something that would be wrong if (and only if) other humans with a sense of justice were upset. And since this is true in the case of these humans, we cannot rationally deny the same in the case of animals.” Cruelty-Kindness View • Being for kindness and against cruelty does not settle the issue about moral treatment of animals. – Regan: We might be kind and still be acting immorally. For example, a kind racist is still acting immorally in discriminating in favor of members of his own racial group and being kind to them. The kind acts may be rooted in injustice – Absence of cruelty does not assure that one avoids doing what is wrong Utilitarianism • Two Moral Principles 1. Equality: “everyone’s interests count, and similar interests must be counted as having similar weight or importance. White or black, American or Iranian, human or animal” 2. Utility: “do the act that will bring about the best balance between satisfaction and frustration for everyone affected by the outcome” • “The great appeal of utilitarianism rests with its uncompromising egalitarianism: everyone’s interests count and count as much as the like interests of everyone else. The kind of odious discrimination that some forms of contractarianism can justify—discrimination based on race or sex, for example—seems disallowed in principle by utilitarianism, as is speciesism, systematic discrimination based on species membership.” Problems with Utilitarianism 1. Individuals have no value; only their feelings do – “For the utilitarian you and I are like the cup; we have no value as individuals and thus no equal value. What has value is what goes into us, what we serve as receptacles for; our feelings of satisfaction have positive value, our feelings of frustration negative value.” Problems with Utilitarianism • Injustice – “My Aunt Bea is old, inactive, a cranky, sour person, though not physically ill. She prefers to go on living. She is also rather rich. I could make a fortune if I could get my hands on her money, money she intends to give me in any event, after she dies, but which she refuses to give me now. In order to avoid a huge tax bite, I plan to donate a handsome sum of my profits to a local children’s hospital. Many, many children will benefit from my generosity, and much joy will be brought to their parents, relatives and friends. If I don’t get the money rather soon, all these ambitions will come to naught. The once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make a real killing will be gone. Why, then, not kill my Aunt Bea? Oh, of course I might get caught. But I’m no fool and, besides, her doctor can be counted on to co-operate (he has an eye for the same investment and I happen to know a good deal about his shady past). The deed can be done . . . professionally, shall we say. There is very little chance of getting caught. And as for my conscience being guilt-ridden, I am a resourceful sort of fellow and will take more than sufficient comfort – as I lie on the beach at Acapulco – in contemplating the joy and health I have brought to so many others. Suppose Aunt Bea is killed and the rest of the story comes out as told. Would I have done anything wrong? Anything immoral? One would have thought that I had. Not according to utilitarianism. Since what I have done has brought about the best balance between totaled satisfaction and frustration for all those affected by the outcome, my action is not wrong. Indeed, in killing Aunt Bea the physician and I did what duty required.” Regan’s Inherent Value View • Each individual has “inherent value”: – “suppose we consider that you and I, for example, do have value as individuals — what we’ll call inherent value. To say we have such value is to say that we are something more than, something different from, mere receptacles. Moreover, . . . . we must believe that all who have inherent value have it equally, regardless of their sex, race, religion, birthplace and so on — all have inherent value, all possess it equally, and all have an equal right to be treated with respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status of things, as if they existed as resources for others. My value as an individual is independent of my usefulness to you. Yours is not dependent on your usefulness to me. For either of us to treat the other in ways that fail to show respect for the other’s independent value is to act immorally, to violate the individual’s rights.” Rights View • “The rights view, I believe, is rationally the most satisfactory moral theory. It surpasses all other theories in the degree to which it illuminates and explains the foundation of our duties to one another – the domain of human morality.” Basic Similarity between Humans and Animals • “we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. . . . And the same is true of those animals that concern us (the ones that are eaten and trapped, for example), they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own.” The Argument 1. We ought to treat similar things similarly. 2. We ought to respect the rights of every human because each is an experiencing subject of a life with inherent value. 3. Animals are similar to humans because each is an experiencing subject of a life with inherent value. 4. Thus, we ought to respect the rights of animals. Counterarguments: Only Humans Have Inherent Value • Only humans have the requisite intelligence, autonomy, reason – Reply: these traits not evenly distributed among humans, nonetheless those humans lacking these traits are still thought to have inherent value • Only humans are members of the right species, Homo sapiens – Reply: Blatant speciesism • Only humans have immortal souls – Reply: controversial assumption that confuses the issue more than it resolves it Counterargument: Humans Have More Inherent Value than Animals • Regan thinks there is no rational justification for thinking that humans have more inherent value than animals. – If one says that it is due to intelligence, autonomy, or reason, then one has to admit that some humans have less inherent value than other humans. – “All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not.” “Experiencing Subjects of a Life” • Humans and animals are both experiencing subjects of a life. • Since both humans and animals are similar in this respect, both have inherent value. • Since both humans and animals have inherent value, both have an equal right to be treated with respect. Implications of Regan’s Argument for Inherent Value of Animals 1. Animals rights movement is “part of” (“not antagonistic to”) the human rights movement. The theory than grounds animal rights also ground human rights. 2. All testing of animals should be abolished – “Lab animals are not our tasters; we are not their kings.” 3. All commercial animal agriculture should be stopped. 4. All hunting and trapping for commercial and sporting ends should be stopped. Mary Anne Warren, “A Critique of Regan’s Animals Rights Theory” • Warren argues against Regan’s Animal Rights view, rejecting what she calls “the strong animal rights position.” However, she supports a “weak animal rights view.” – Strong Animal Rights – Weak Animal Rights First Problem: The Mystery of Inherent Value 1. The notion of “Inherent Value” is too obscure to do the job Regan requires of it. 2. There is no clear connection between value and moral rights. Second Problem: Drawing Lines • It is not clear that a sharp line can be drawn between those animals which have inherent value, and those that don’t. Any line drawing looks arbitrary. Weak Animal Rights View: Difference between Humans and Animals • What divides human animals from non-human animals is the capacity for rational thought, which provides for reasoned co-operation and non-violent conflict resolution. Also, our capacity for rational thought makes us more dangerous, which leads to the need to have clear controls over our behavior. So, being able to change our behavior based upon rational argument is what separates us from other animals. Weak Animal Rights View • Animals which pursue certain satisfactions have the right to a life in which they pursue those satisfactions. • Sentient animals have the right to live without intentionally inflicted suffering. • Sentient animals have the right not to be killed “without good reason.” Question-begging? • What would be “a good reason” to harm or kill animals? Module 04: Lecture 03: Leopold and Callicott on Ecocentric Ethics This lecture will help you understand: • Ecocentrism • Darwin’s theory of ethics • The meaning of “holism” • The Land Pyramid • Regan’s criticism of the land ethic and Callicott’s reply Aldo Leopold (1887-1948) A Sand County Almanac (1949) “Thinking Like a Mountain” • “The cowman who cleans his range of wolves does not realize that he is taking over the wolf’s job of trimming the herd to fit the range. He has not learned to think like a mountain. Hence we have dustbowls, and rivers washing the future into the sea.” • Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac “When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars in Troy, he hanged all on one rope a dozen slave-girls of his house-hold, whom he suspected of misbehavior during his absence. This hanging involved no question of propriety. The girls were property. The disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of expediency, not of right and wrong. Concepts of right and wrong were not lacking from Odysseus’ Greece: witness the fidelity of his wife through the long years before at last his black-prowed galleys clove the wine-dark seas for home. The ethical structure of that day covered wives, but had not yet been extended to human chattels. During the three thousand years which have since elapsed, ethical criteria have been extended to many fields of conduct, with corresponding shrinkages in those judged by expediency only.” Expanding the Moral Community • Leopold uses this example to call for an “extension of ethics” to include human relations to the land. Expanding the Moral Community Sliding Scale of Environmentalism Anthropocentrism Aristotle Aquinas Descartes Kant Sentiocentrism Bentham Singer Regan Zoocentrism Biocentrism Schweitzer Rolston Taylor Ecocentrism/ Deep Ecology Leopold Naess Devall Sessions Ethics Evolves! • “This extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequence may be described in ecological as well as in philosophic terms.” What is an Ecological Ethic? • Philosophical ethic: “An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct.” • Ecological ethic: “An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence.” – Leopold thinks these two ethics are basically the same Ecology (from Greek: oikos, “house”; -logia, “study of”) • “The study of the relationships of organisms to one another and to the natural environment” Community Cooperation • Leopold’s ecological ethic contrasts with many Western philosophical traditions (Moses, Hobbes, Rawls, Plato, etc.) – Either God hands down moral codes – Or reason defines those who are moral beings and the nature of moral valuing • Leopold’s ecological ethic looks instead to community cooperation grounded in the social sentiments – For both David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) grounded morality in our human nature in the form of “sentiments.” Darwin and Social Sentiments • Darwin also viewed our morality as a function of our human nature, which includes certain social instincts he called (after Hume and Smith) “sentiments.” • Social instincts and sentiments are adaptations which increase the inclusive fitness of those who form cooperative social bonds – “Inclusive fitness”: the expansion of the Darwinian concept of the fitness of a genotype to include benefits accrued to relatives of an individual since relatives share parts of their genomes. Charles Darwin (1809-1882) Land Ethic • “All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts….The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.” – Humans are not conquerors, but members of the ecological community – If one interprets human history ecologically, then one understands the “conquests” of humans as dependent on the lands “tamed” and used for human purposes • Plants and land determined the course of human history as much as the humans utilizing these resources (e.g., Kentucky cane-lands became bluegrass) “Land” = collectively animals, plants, soils, and waters Land Ethic and Community Concept • Callicott: “The community concept is the ‘basic concept of ecology’…. Once land is popularly perceived as a biotic community… a correlative land ethic will emerge in the collective cultural consciousness.” • Just as human society depends on security and economic interdependency with (ethical) rules maintaining this social balance by restricting freedoms, so too an interdependent ecological community can be maintained only by similar restrictions on freedom of action – Leopold envisions his land ethic as such a restriction that is meant to maintain the ecological community “Holism” • Holism (from holos, a Greek word meaning all, whole, entire, total) , is the idea that natural systems (physical, biological, chemical, etc. and their properties, should be viewed as wholes, not as collections of parts. • Whereas most ethical systems are egocentric, they are concerned with the interests of the self and specifically a rational, psychological self, the conceptual foundations of Leopold’s holistic Land Ethic is based on moral consideration of the whole. – Humans have inherited a social moral sense from primates – Our social moral sense must include the entire ecological community of which we are a part (not just other humans) – The interests of society are our interests and are the proper objects of our moral sentiments Land Pyramid Land is not simply soil, but the foundation of the earth’s energy circuit starting with the sun’s energy • Top layer: larger carnivores • Many layers in-between until… • Next: bird and rodents • Next layer: insects • Next layer: plants • Bottom layer: soil Land Pyramid • The inhabitants of a particular layer (“biota”) are defined by what they eat – Inhabitants of one layer eat and depend on the inhabitants of lower layers – The higher the level on the pyramid, the more the inhabitants depend on the inhabitants of lower levels – Humans inhabit a middle layer (along with bears, squirrels, and raccoons) they eat both meat and vegetables • These chains of dependency reflect the transmission of energy in the food chain Fountain of Energy • “Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil.” • Upward flow of energy depends on the complex, interrelated structures of the pyramid • “Land” is seen as a superorganism metaphorically represented as the interconnected energy unit from pyramid base (soil) to apex (carnivores) “Key-log” • “The key-log which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient.” Evolution and Changes in Energy Circuit • Evolutionary changes in the circuit require changes and adaptation from other parts of the energy unit • Throughout the long period of evolution the flow of energy and energy circuit has lengthened and diversified Human-made Changes in Energy Circuit • Man-made changes are fundamentally different than evolutionary changes: – Man-made changes occur violently and rapidly: not all environments can adapt – Man-made changes create “disorganization” and reduced complexity (pyramid becomes “squat”) – Disorganization and reduced complexity reduce the carrying capacity of the land for humans, animals, and plants The Land Ethic • “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” – How we ought to behave toward the land is not solely an issue of economic feasibility – We ought to act in ways that preserve and protect the entire biotic community – How we ought to act is determined by what is ethically right, aesthetically right, and economically right Criticism: Environmental Fascism • If what governs our moral considerations and behaviors is the stability and welfare of the biotic community and we are members of the biotic community, then what the land ethic justifies for some species applies to humans as well. • So, if the land ethic implies that certain species (deer) be culled to protect the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, then we are justified in culling other overpopulated species (humans) which threaten the welfare of the biotic community. • So, the land ethic appears to imply that it is our duty to allow or bring about human death en masse in order to decrease the population. Regan’s Criticism: “Environmental Fascism” • “The difficulties and implications of developing a rights-based environmental ethics … include reconciling the individualistic nature of moral rights with the more holistic view of nature …. Aldo Leopold is illustrative of this latter tendency …. The implications of this view include the clear prospect that the individual may be sacrificed for the greater biotic good, in the name of “the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.” It is difficult to see how the notion of the rights of the individual could find a home within a view that … might be fairly dubbed “environmental fascism.” Callicott’s Response: Human Moral Develop Like the Development of a Tree Wild Flowers • One’s immediate moral obligations are to those closest to the heartwood, namely one’s family • As social relations grow and extend outward, then new rings of moral obligation are layered onto the heartwood. • Moral commitments to friends, social groups, community, state, nation, humanity expand as one moves from the heartwood. • At the same time, one’s moral commitments to one’s inner circle does not diminish even though one’s moral commitments expand into the biotic community of which one is a member. Close Family Nation Callicott’s Conclusion • “The land ethic, therefore, is not draconian or fascist. It does not cancel human morality. The land ethic may, however, as with any new accretion, demand choices which affect, in turn, the demands of the more interior social-ethical circles….While the land ethic, certainly, does not cancel human morality, neither does it leave it unaffected.” – While many living things do not have human rights because they are not human, we should treat these organisms with moral respect since they are important, if not essential to the biotic community of which we are a part Some Questions to Ponder • What exactly is our responsibility to nature or to a particular ecosystem? • What is the relative value of humanity vis-a-vis natural processes? • Is the human being of special value in nature, or is he or she simply a “plain member and citizen of it,” to be accorded no more rights or value than any other functioning part of the whole? M04Lec02: Schweitzer and Taylor on Biocentric Ethics This lecture will help you understand: • Schweitzer’s theory of “reverence for life” • Taylor’s theory of “biocentric egalitarianism” involving: – Moral attitude of respect for nature – Duties to individual organisms grounded in the concept of inherent worth – Biocentric outlook on nature – Denial of human superiority Albert Schweitzer • Theologian • Concert organist • Musicologist • Philosopher • Physician • Medical missionary René Descartes (1596-1650) • Famous for his claim: “I think therefore I am” (Meditations 1641). • Descartes considered this to be the first certainty in philosophy and the basis on which to build the world of knowledge and science. Descartes’ “Abstraction” SUBJECT (“I think”) OBJECT (the world, others) Opening Salvo: “I am life that wills to live” • Descartes tells us that philosophizing is based on the judgment: “I think, therefore I am.” From this meager and arbitrarily selected beginning it is inevitable that it should wander into the path of the abstract. It does not find the entrance to the ethical realm, and remains held fast in a dead view of the world and of life. True philosophy must commence with the most immediate and comprehensive facts of consciousness. And this may be formulated as follows: “I am life which wills to live, and I exist in the midst of life which wills to live.“ (“Ich bin Leben, das leben will in mitten von Leben, das leben will.”) Schweitzer’s Environmental Ethics • “Ethics thus consists in this, that I experience the necessity of practicing the same reverence for life toward all will-to-life, as toward my own. Therein I have already the needed fundamental principle of morality. It is good to maintain and cherish life; it is evil to destroy and to check life.” Reverence for Life • “To him life as such is sacred. He shatters no ice crystal that sparkles in the sun, tears no leaf from its tree, breaks off no flower, and is careful not to crush any insect as he walks. If he works by lamplight on a summer evening, he prefers to keep the window shut and to breathe stifling air, rather than to see insect after insect fall on his table with singed and sinking wings. If he goes out into the street after a rainstorm and sees a worm which has strayed there, he reflects that it will certainly dry up in the sunshine, if it does not quickly regain the damp soil into which it can creep, and so he helps it back from the deadly paving stones into the lush grass. Should he pass by an insect which has fallen into a pool, he spares the time to reach it a leaf or stalk on which it may clamber and save itself. He is not afraid of being laughed at as sentimental. . . .” Question: Where is Schweitzer’s error? a. Plants do not have a nervous system and thus are not “sacred.” b. Ice crystals are not alive, so what is the problem with shattering them? c. He shouldn’t interfere with nature by putting the worm back into the damp soil. d. Why shouldn’t he work with the windows open even if it means killing a moth? After all, he too is a living organism with needs. “To him life as such is sacred. He shatters no ice crystal that sparkles in the sun, tears no leaf from its tree, breaks off no flower, and is careful not to crush any insect as he walks. If he works by lamplight on a summer evening, he prefers to keep the window shut and to breathe stifling air, rather than to see insect after insect fall on his table with singed and sinking wings. If he goes out into the street after a rainstorm and sees a worm which has strayed there, he reflects that it will certainly dry up in the sunshine, if it does not quickly regain the damp soil into which it can creep, and so he helps it back from the deadly paving stones into the lush grass. Should he pass by an insect which has fallen into a pool, he spares the time to reach it a leaf or stalk on which it may clamber and save itself. Question: Where is Schweitzer’s error? a. Plants do not have a nervous system and thus are not “sacred.” b. Ice crystals are not alive, so what is the problem with shattering them? c. He shouldn’t interfere with nature by putting the worm back into the damp soil. d. Why shouldn’t he work with the windows open even if it means killing a moth? After all, he too is a living organism with needs. “To him life as such is sacred. He shatters no ice crystal that sparkles in the sun, tears no leaf from its tree, breaks off no flower, and is careful not to crush any insect as he walks. If he works by lamplight on a summer evening, he prefers to keep the window shut and to breathe stifling air, rather than to see insect after insect fall on his table with singed and sinking wings. If he goes out into the street after a rainstorm and sees a worm which has strayed there, he reflects that it will certainly dry up in the sunshine, if it does not quickly regain the damp soil into which it can creep, and so he helps it back from the deadly paving stones into the lush grass. Should he pass by an insect which has fallen into a pool, he spares the time to reach it a leaf or stalk on which it may clamber and save itself. Religious Basis for Biocentrism • “Thought becomes religious when it thinks itself out to the end. The ethic of reverence for life is the ethic of Jesus brought to philosophical expression, extended into cosmical form, and conceived as intellectually necessary.” Paul Taylor • Paul W. Taylor is professor emeritus in philosophy at Brooklyn College, City University of New York. • Best known for his secular theory of biocentric egalitarianism first published in his 1986 book Respect for Nature. Taylor’s Argument • Taylor argues for a biocentric or “lifecentered” system of environmental ethics. This is the view that every organism has a good of its own and is inherently worthy – “From the perspective of a life-centered theory, we have prima facie moral obligations that are owed to wild plants and animals themselves as members of the Earth’s biotic community. We are morally bound (other things being equal) to protect or promote their good for their sake.” Three Elements of Ethics of Respect for Nature 1. A belief system: biocentric outlook on nature 2. A moral attitude: respect for nature 3. A set of rules of duty and standards of character: nonmaleficence, noninterference, fairness, benevolence Why Accept a Life-centered Ethics? 1. Because every individual organism has a good of its own 2. Because every individual organism with a good of its own has inherent worth “Good of Its Own” • “We can think of the good of an individual nonhuman organism as consisting in the full development of its biological powers. Its good is realized to the extent that it is strong and healthy. It possesses whatever capacities it needs for successfully coping with its environment and so preserving its existence throughout the various stages of the normal life cycle of its species.” “Good of Its Own” • “The idea of a being having a good of its own, as I understand it, does not entail that the being must have interests or take an interest in what affects its life for better or for worse.” • Taylor Draws a distinction between: • “X takes an interest in Y” (“The plant takes an interest in being watered” No!) • “Y is in X’s interest, i.e., it’s for its own good” (“Watering is in the plant’s interest” Yes!) “Inherent Worth” • What does it mean to regard an entity that has a good of its own as possessing inherent worth? • Involves two principles: 1. 2. The principle of moral consideration: “From the moral point of view their good must be taken into account whenever it is affected for better or worse by the conduct of rational agents. This holds no matter what species the creature belongs to.” The principle of intrinsic value: “This means that its good is prima facie worthy of being preserved or promoted as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is. Insofar as we regard any organism, species population, or life community as an entity having inherent worth, we believe that it must never be treated as if it were a mere object or thing whose entire value lies in being instrumental to the good of some other entity.” Respect for Nature • Parallels attitude of Kantian “respect” for humans in that we treat humans as ends in themselves and intrinsically valuable. • Taylor calls this attitude “respect for nature” • Demands a commitment to live by certain moral principles – Rules of conduct for actions toward natural world – Moral because it is a disinterested matter or principle The Biocentric Outlook • Biocentric outlook on nature is the belief system underlying the attitude of respect for nature – Philosophical world view grounded in science, but not to be confused with a scientific explanation or theory. • Science of ecology tells us of the interconnectedness and interdependence of the natural world • The balance and stability of the organic world is essential for the realization of the goods of biotic communities Components of Biocentric Outlook on Nature 1. Humans are members of Earth’s community and terms of human membership are no different than terms of nonhuman members 2. Earth’s ecosystems and the well-functioning of these ecosystems are interconnected and interdependent. 3. Each individual organism is a “teleological center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way” 4. In terms of merit or inherent worth, humans are not superior to other species 1. Terms of Membership • Human membership on earth is the same as all other living organisms. Human origins grounded in the same evolutionary processes as other species’ origins – “The laws of genetics, natural selection, and adaptation apply equally to all of us as biological creatures” • Human presence on earth is recent (a mere 100,000 years compared to the dinosaurs’ 65 million years!) and there’s no justification for seeing humans as more valuable from the perspective of evolution • Human presence on earth is not necessary, indeed is detrimental, to the survival of other species and the planet’s ecosystems – ”If we were to take the standpoint of the community and give voice to its true interest, the ending of our six-inch epoch would most likely be greeted with a hearty “Good riddance!” 2. Interconnected and Interdependent Natural World • Biocentric outlook views the natural world as a unified collection of inter-related organisms, events, and objects – The well-being of wild animals and humans requires that ecological equilibrium be maintained – The long-term integrity of the biosphere is necessary for the realization of the good of individual organisms 3. “Teleological Centers of Life” • Each organism is pursuing its biological function according to species-specific mechanisms • If one conceives of each organism as a teleological center of life, then one can view the world from that organism’s perspective – One can conceive of that organism’s own good – Conceiving of the world from the organism’s perspective does not entail that one imposes human characteristics onto the organism or the organism’s own good • Moral evaluation and judgments about the organism require that we see the world from that organism’s perspective Definition of an Organism • “An entity that is composed of various living pars that function together in an integrated way to sustain a single life, and that is not a part of another living organism.” • (Last clause is necessary to in order to exclude the implication that living cells or organs are themselves organisms.) 4. Alleged Superiority of Humans in Terms of Merit • Human judgments about human superiority are based on criteria that are important to humans – What criteria (or merits) are important for humans to have a good life are not the same criteria as what is important for nonhumans • Humans are better philosophers than monkeys, but monkeys are better climbers than humans • It is human civilization makes mathematical skills more valuable than climbing skills – “But is it not unreasonable to judge nonhumans by the values of human civilization, rather than by values connected with what it is for a member of that species to live a good life? If all living things have a good of their own, it at least makes sense to judge the merits of nonhumans by standards derived from their good.” 4. Alleged Superiority of Humans in Terms of Inherent Worth • Inherent worth depends on placing intrinsic value on the realization of an organism’s own good • But, then, how is one to claim that one organism is more inherently worthy than another? – It used to be argued that the inherent worth of members of one social class (“blue blood”) was superior to the inherent worth of members of a lower social class—a claim that is now widely rejected • Why think that one organism is more or less superior to other organisms due to genetic background? 4. Alleged Superiority of Humans in Terms of Rationality • Since Greek times humans have been thought to be superior to nonhuman animals in virtue of human rationality – This Western perspective about the superiority of reason is not an argument but merely a prejudice or bias in our favor • Rationality may help humans achieve their goods, but it is obviously not essential for nonhuman animals in achieving theirs, which do perfectly well without it. – “Other creatures achieve their species-specific good without the need of rationality, although they often make use of capacities that humans lack.” – E.g., unassisted flight, echo location, camouflage, etc. 4. Alleged superiority of Humans in Terms of the Possession of a Soul • Humans are often thought to be superior to nonhuman animals in virtue of possessing an immaterial soul (Descartes). – “Why is a soul substance a thing that adds value to its possessor? Unless some theological reasoning is offered here (which many, including myself, would find unacceptable on epistemological [i.e., knowledge-related] grounds), no logical connection is evident.” 4. Alleged superiority of Humans in Terms of The Great Chain of Being • Following a Judeo-Christian creation story, humans are at the pinnacle of creation – If we lack rational grounds for accepting the metaphysics of this Judeo-Christian model, then there are no grounds for accepting the superiority of human in terms of the Great Chain of Being Respect for Nature Arises From Rejection of Human Superiority • “Once we reject the claim that humans are superior either in merit or in worth to other living things, we are ready to adopt the attitude of respect. The denial of human superiority is itself the result of taking the perspective on nature built into the first three elements of the biocentric outlook.” Components of Biocentric Outlook on Nature 1. Humans are members of Earth’s community and terms of human membership are no different than terms of nonhuman members 2. Earth’s ecosystems and the well-functioning of these ecosystems are interconnected and interdependent. 3. Each individual organism is a “teleological center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way” 4. In terms of merit or inherent worth, humans are not superior to other species Expanding the Moral Community Sliding Scale of Environmentalism Anthropocentrism Aristotle Aquinas Descartes Kant Sentiocentrism Bentham Singer Regan Zoocentrism Biocentrism Schweitzer Rolston Taylor Ecocentrism/ Deep Ecology Leopold Naess Devall Sessions M04Lec01: Rolston and Hettinger on Values This lecture will help you understand: • Axiology – Intrinsic vs. Instrumental value – Objective vs. subjective value • A critique of anthropocentrism • What “naturalizing” means • A defense of the claim nature has objective value Holmes Rolston, III (1932-), University Distinguished Professor of philosophy at Colorado State University “Naturalizing Values: Organisms and Species” (1998) What Kind of Value Does Nature Have? • The question of what kind of value does nature have is vitally important to environmental ethics. • Some environmental philosophers hold that nature has objective value. Axiology • Axiology (from Greek ἀξίᾱ, axiā, “value, worth”; and -λόγος, -logos) is the philosophical study of value. • Value denotes something’s degree of worth or importance, i.e., something considered to be “good.” Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value • Intrinsic Value – Things that are good in themselves (“intrinsically good”) and for no other reason (e.g., happiness); “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” • Instrumental (Extrinsic) Value – Things that are not good in themselves, but only good for what they bring (e.g., a hammer or money) Objective vs. Subjective Value • There is also the question whether values are – subjective, i.e., only exist in the minds of “appraisers” (self-conscious evaluators like human beings) or experiencers (sentient beings like dogs, mice, and frogs) – objective, i.e., exist independently of an evaluator (like table and chairs, stars and atoms) Analogy with Primary and Secondary Qualities (John Locke, 1632-1704, Essay concerning Human Understanding) • Primary qualities: – Properties objects have that are independent of any observer. • • • • • Solidity Extension motion Number figure. – They exist in the thing itself, and do not rely on subjective judgments. • Secondary qualities (“the sugar is not sweet until tasted”): – Properties that produce sensations in observers. • • • • Color Taste Smell Sound – They can be described as the effect things have on certain people. Knowledge that comes from secondary qualities does not provide objective facts about things. If a tree falls in a forest • “If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?” George Berkeley (16851753), also known as Bishop Berkeley Intrinsic Value • An object or experience valued for its own sake, such as happiness, pleasure, a moment of insight, a religious experience, or a sense of well-being. It need not refer to its contributions to other values. • According to Aristotle, the end of everything we do is happiness. It is contrasted to a means, which is something that helps you achieve that goal. For example, money or power may be said to be a means to the end of happiness. Instrumental (Extrinsic) Value • Something valued for the sake of some other value, such as a hammer, used in order to hang a picture. Subjective Value • Something, say a landscape, that becomes valuable by being appraised by an evaluator. My pleasure at seeing a landscape endows it with value. Value is in the eyes (or mind) of the beholder (or evaluator). Objective Value • Something that is valuable whether or not anyone appraises it as such. The landscape might be said to be good because of the features it possesses, whether or not anyone is there to see it. Life might be said to be good whether or not it is sentient, let alone whether anyone is able to appreciate it. Trilobite 526 million years ago Number 8, 1949 (detail) 1949 (280 Kb); Oil, enamel, and aluminum paint on canvas; Neuberger Museum, State University of New York Moore’s Isolation Test • G. E. Moore (1873-1958) proposes a certain kind of thought-experiment in order both to come to understand the concept better and to reach a decision about what is intrinsically good. • He asks us to consider whether there are things that, if they existed by themselves “in absolute isolation,” would still be judged good by us. • Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire mountains, rivers, the sea; trees, and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine the all combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that no one thing jars against another, but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason, and the whole, as far as may be, without one redeeming feature. . . . The only thing we are not entitled to imagine is that any human being ever has or ever, by any possibility, can, live in either, can ever see and enjoy the beauty of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so, supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the other? (Moore, Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, p. 135) Rolston’s Chief Claim • Rolston argues that values exist in nature (or the universe) objectively, apart from human choice or consciousness or even animal consciousness. • He is thus concerned to reject anthropocentrism, the idea that human beings are the center of the world and that without us the world has no value. • For people like Rolston and others, it is anthropocentrism that has brought on our present environmental crisis. Naturalizing Values • Naturalizing values is to explain values by appeal to natural properties (nature), where natural properties are those properties included in scientific discourse. – Natural properties contrast with supernatural properties At one time, when people fell to the ground and shook violently, the explanation was demon possession (supernatural). We now know that similar episodes are epileptic seizures (natural) caused by electrical disruptions in the brain “Survival Value” • The way in which Rolston attempts to explain the existence of values in nature is through biology and Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. • What is fundamental to the existence of all biological beings is evolution through natural selection. Organisms have a set of traits adaptations and behaviors that are valuable to the organism insofar as they increase its chances of survival. Such traits thus have what we call “a survival value.” • So, looking at the traits and processes selected for in any one biological being will tell one what has “survival value,” i.e., traits that nature itself “values.” Dragonflies, Leaf Stomata, etc. • Rolston uses several examples to contrast what nature values and what philosophers have traditionally valued: – Nature values the preservation of biological identity, the preservation of species, or whatever traits serve the needs of the biological organism – Philosophers have traditionally valued things of human origin, significance, or creation Standing in Contrast • Naturalizing axiology stands in contrast to two predominant theories of valuing nature 1. Anthropic views: referencing humans 2. Sentiocentric views: referencing sentience Anthropic Views of Valuing Nature • Anthropocentric values: A thing is valuable because it benefits human life or practices. • Anthropogenic values: Things become valuable only because a human evaluator appraises them as valuable. – For example, humans may value a sequoia tree because of what it is. This example would be a subjective view of intrinsic value in nature because it claims that value requires an evaluator. – Norton example: “Valuing always occurs from the viewpoint of a conscious valuer . . . . Only the humans are valuing agents.” (110) – Callicott example: “there simply is no inherent or intrinsic value in nature (111), i.e., nature’s value depends on human valuers. Giant Redwood “Value apartheid” • The unjustifiable axiological separation of humans from nature. • This is inconsistent if: 1. We affirm that humans are not metaphysically different from nature. 2. We are sealed off from nature so thoroughly that we cannot know enough about the natural world to know if it is valuable. How then can we claim to know that there are no independent values that arise in the natural world? “Light-in-the-refrigerator” • Rolston calls this type of subjectivism the “lightin-the-refrigerator theory.” Nothing inside is of value until I open the door and the light comes on. (109) Sentiocentric Views of Valuing Nature • Singer: humans and all sentient animals are able to value – Implication of this position is that there are values and valuers independent of humans • But, if we consider having a spinal column as necessary for sentience, then Singer’s criterion for value and valuers will leave approximately 96% of the biological world valueless (as only 4% is “vertebragenic”). Experiential Blinders • “Maybe the problem is that we have let ourselves get imprisoned in our own felt experiences. . . We do have blinders on, psychological and philosophical blinders, that leave us unable to detect anything but experientially-based valuers and their felt values. So we are unable to accept a biologically based value account that is otherwise staring us in the face.” Life According to Plants • Plants are not experiencing subjects and they are not inanimate objects • Plants are living organisms that are “selfactualizing” – They are “unified entities of the botanical though not of the zoological kind” – They are modular organisms capable of specialized processes, including producing vegetative and reproductive modules – Plants repair injuries, move nutrients, photosynthesize, store sugars, give off oxygen Natural Selection as the Observer Independent Basis for Value • “Natural selection picks out whatever traits an organism has that are valuable to it, relative to its survival. When natural selection has been at work gathering these traits into an organism, that organism is able to value on the basis of those traits. It is a valuing organism, even if the organism is not a sentient valuer, much less a vertebrate, much less a human evaluator. And those traits, though picked out by natural selection, are innate in the organism. It is difficult to dissociate the idea of value from natural selection.” What is good is observer independent • Nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and water are good for plants – These are objectively determined and do not require an observer • What is the good of the plant? – The good of the plant is determined by objective means and is encoded in the plant’s DNA – The good of the plant is seen in what matters to the survival of the plant and others of its kind Things Matter for Trees • “True, things do not matter to trees; still, a great deal matters for them. We ask, of a falling tree, What’s the matter with that tree? If it is lacking sunshine and soil nutrients and we arrange for these, we say, the tree is benefiting from them; and benefit is—everywhere else we encounter it—a value word.” Rolston’s Basic Argument 1. A naturalized value theory must talk about the good of a thing being valued. 2. To objectively (observer independent) determine the good of a thing, one must determine what matters for (not “to”) that kind of thing. 3. What matters for the thing of a kind is determined by those traits that thing possesses. 4. The traits a thing possesses are encoded in the genome of that thing. 5. The genome of biological things is determined by the observer independent processes of natural selection. 6. Therefore, natural selection is the basis for value. Summary of Rolston’s Argument • “My most frequent line of argument (for objective value in nature) is that value language is used all the time about plants and their activities. The plant needs sunshine, nutrients, photosynthesizes, makes sugar, secretes toxins to prevent insect damage, makes seeds. Most of biology is at the non-sentient level. What genes do is conserve value. I try to get these folk to see that any account of an organism defending its life is value-laden. Insects as well as plants. If they concede, well, yes plants do value sugar, then the whole question of value has to be opened wide up. En route will come species, ecosystems, still in the living world. Later will come canyons, mountains, rivers, crystals, leaving the living world. At this point I move to thinking of the creative process in, with, and under the formation of the planet with its powers of achievement as valuable.” Criticism • Philosophers know how to use words with precision, but biologists have “dirtied up” value theory with their use of value terms in biology • Rolston’s Response: – Biologically speaking, the wolf may value her pups – The Darwinian world of survival and natural selection would lose its explanatory power if all valuing terms (“survival value”) were removed Hettinger’s Criticism • While plants may have a good of their own (their flourishing), why think that we humans have to value or morally consider this good? – We need some reason to think that we should promote some biological being’s acknowledged good • “Some account is needed as to why we humans ought to preserve, protect, and restore these goods in nonhuman nature.” • Let’s see if there’s an answer in Schweitzer’s and Taylor’s “Biocentric Egalitarianism” (see next lecture)
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